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SEX, DRUGS, AND DEMOCRACY: WHO'S AFRAID
OF FREE SPEECH?

Arthur D. Hellman*
In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,1the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA") violates the First
Amendment because it relies on "community standards" to identify material on
the World Wide Web that is "harmful to minors."2 When the case came to the
United States Supreme Court, eight Justices agreed that the Third Circuit's
holding was error. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing the lead opinion, saw no
constitutional impediment to "requiring a speaker disseminating material to a
national audience to observe varying community standards."3 Justice John Paul
Stevens was the sole dissenter. He agreed with the Third Circuit that the statute
is substantially overbroad.
Reading this decision in isolation, one might infer that, among the Justices
now on the Court, Justice Stevens is the paladin of free speech. From that same
perspective, Justice Thomas would appear to be among the Justices least
sensitive to the values embodied in the First Amendment.4
The reality is quite different. When we look at the full spectrum of free
speech cases decided by the current Court, we find that Justice Thomas actually
outranks Justice Stevens as a supporter of First Amendment claims. And when
we disaggregate the cases and look at major categories separately, the gap
becomes even wider. Justice Thomas emerges as a champion of free speech in

* Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh
School of
Law. This article was written for the First Amendment Discussion Forum held at the University
of Louisville School of Law on November 16, 2002. The author expresses thanks to Matthew
Hellman, Stephen L. Wasby, and James Weinstein for helpful comments and to Tom
Welshonce, Class of 2004, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, for excellent research
assistance.
1 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
2 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
3 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 579 (plurality opinion).
4 In this essay, references to "the First Amendment" encompass only the provisions that
protect freedom of expression, i.e. the guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
the right peacefully to assemble, and the right to petition the Government for the redress of
grievances.
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the tradition of Justice William J. Brennan, 5 while Justice Stevens repeatedly
takes a niggardly view of the protection accorded by the constitutional
guarantee.
I believe that we can learn much from contrasting the positions taken in the
COPA opinions with the pattern of the Justices' responses to the larger array of
First Amendment issues. The enterprise may generate more questions than
answers, but if so, that is in the best tradition of the First Amendment.
I. FROM EXON TO ASHCROFT
In February 1995, Senator James Exon (Democrat Nebraska) introduced
Senate Bill 314, the Communications Decency Act.6 The purpose of the
legislation, he explained, was "to expand the decency provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934 to clearly cover the new technologies which are
increasingly part of the American way of life."7 Senator Exon referred to "the
information superhighway" and the malefactors "who would electronically
cruise the digital world.",8 He made no mention of the Internet, although a
newspaper article attached to his statement described the Internet as "the vast
network of computer connections throughout the world." 9
Initially, the Communications Decency Act did not look like a bill with a
future. It had only one cosponsor. Editorialists, columnists, and newspaper
letter writers attacked it. For example, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette condemned
the proposal as "an ill-defined global ban" and expressed concern about
"trampling on the rights ...to free expression."' 0 By the spring of 1995, the
measure was "written off for dead."'"

5 Perhaps I should say: "Justice Brennan circa 1964." See infra note 114.
6 Senator Exon said that his proposal "was approved last year by the Senate Commerce

Committee as part of the Communications Act of 1994." 141 CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb.
1, 1995). However, the 1994 legislation did no more than "apply the current provisions on
indecency and harassing telephone calls to all telecommunications services." S. REP. No. 103367, at 25 (1994).
7 141 CONG. REc. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995).
8 Id.
9 Id. (quoting Washington Post news story).

10 Steve Creedy, Senate Morality Way Off-Line, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 29,
1995, at B 10 (available on NEXIS, News database).
11 Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cyberporn-Ona Screen Near You, TIME, July 3, 1995, reprinted in
141 CONG. REC. S9017, 9020 (daily ed. June 26, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
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Senator Exon persevered notwithstanding the criticism, and on June 9,
1995, he took to the Senate floor to announce a revised version of what he
referred to as the "Exon Decency Act."' 12 This time he did not offer the
measure as a freestanding bill; rather, he proposed it as an amendment to a
massive and important piece of pending legislation, the Telecommunications
Reform Act. Exon told the Senate that the new version of the "Decency Act"
was the product of "a great amount of behind-the-scenes activity," and that it
responded to the concerns raised by "the first amendment scholars" and other
opponents of previous proposals.1413 The bill, he said, embodied principles that
"are simple and constitutional."'
Senator Exon' s June 9 floor speech appears to have been a turning point in
the history of the Communications Decency Act. This was not so much
because of anything Exon said as because of an exhibit he used. After
providing a section-by-section analysis of his amendment for "the legislative
history," he invited his colleagues -to peruse his "blue book."' 5 The "blue
book," he explained, was "a sample of what is available today free of charge"
on Internet bulletin boards.' 6 To "give an idea" of "what is being shown," he
read some of the categories in the index, including "pictures erotica amateur
males" and "erotica bestiality, hamster, duct tape."' 17 He invited his colleagues
to examine the book, which they did. As he later reported:
When I have shown [the "blue book"] to Members on both sides of the aisle,
there has been shock registered, obviously, on the faces of my colleagues,
shock because few understand what is going on today with regard to the
pollution of the Internet. I cannot and would not show these pictures to the
Senate. I would not want our cameras to pick them up.18
Senator Exon also continued to work at fine-tuning the proposed legislation.
On June 14, the Senate took up the new version of the Exon amendment.
Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat Vermont) offered an alternative measure that
would have required "a study by the Department of Justice... on how we can

12

141 CONG. REC.

13 Id. at

S8087-88.

14 Id. at
15 Id. at

S8088.
S8089.

16

Id.

17 Id.
18

58087, 8088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995).

141 CONG. REc. S8330 (daily ed. June 14, 1995).
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empower parents and users of interactive telecommunications systems."' 9
However, after extended debate, the Senate adopted the Exon proposal by a
vote of eighty-four to sixteen. 20 The next day, the Senate passed the massive
Telecommunications Reform Act. 21
The House version of the telecommunications bill had no counterpart to the
Exon amendment, but the conference committee "adopted the Senate
provisions with modifications. 22 The conference report cited Supreme Court
decisions and stated that "these cases firmly establish the principle that the
23
indecency standard [in the new bill] is fully consistent with the Constitution.,
The Senate and the House agreed to the conference report, President Clinton
signed the bill, and the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") became law.
Immediately after the President signed the bill, the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") and other plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of the CDA.
Congress anticipated such a challenge, and the statute included a provision
requiring that the suit be heard by a three-judge district court, with a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. The three-judge court held an evidentiary hearing
and concluded unanimously that two key provisions of the CDA violated the
First Amendment.24
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,25 the Supreme Court affirmed
the holding of unconstitutionality. Because Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented
in part, the power to assign the writing of the Court's opinion fell to the senior
associate justice, Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens - as he often does when
Chief Justice Rehnquist is in dissent - took the opinion for himself. He wrote
at length, rejecting all of the arguments put forth by the Government to sustain
the statute's validity. Only Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist' s dissent.

Id. at S8341 (remarks of Sen. Leahy).
See id. at S8346-47 (daily ed. June 14, 1995).
21 After the Senate adopted the revised Exon amendment, but before the
Telecommunications Act received final passage, six Senators - not including Exon - introduced
a competing measure "to punish transmission by computer of indecent material to minors." See
141 CONG. REc. S9017 (daily ed. June 26, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Grassley). No action was
ever taken on this bill.
22 H.R. REP. No. 104-458 at 130 (1996).
23 Id.
24 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), af3fd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
25 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
19

20
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Congress lost little time before it enacted new legislation to protect children
from exposure to harmful material on the Internet. This legislation was the
Child Online Protection Act. 26 In fashioning the new law, Congress sought to
cure the deficiencies the Supreme Court identified in the CDA. As the Court
explained:
Apparently responding to our objections to the breadth of the CDA's
coverage, Congress limited the scope of COPA's coverage in at least three
ways. First, while the CDA applied to communications over the Internet as a
whole, including, for example, e-mail messages, COPA applies only to
material displayed on the World Wide Web. Second, unlike the CDA, COPA
covers only communications made "for commercial purposes." And third,
while the CDA prohibited "indecent" and "patently offensive"
communications, COPA restricts only the narrower category of "material that

is harmful to minors.

27

One month before the new law was scheduled to go into effect, the ACLU
and other plaintiffs filed suit challenging its constitutionality. Notwithstanding
the limitations Congress had included, the federal district court granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute.2 s The court held that
COPA constitutes a content-based regulation of sexual expression that is29
protected by the First Amendment; it is therefore subject to "strict scrutiny.,
Because the district court found that the law probably could not satisfy that
standard, it concluded that the plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success
on the merits.30
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but it did not endorse or even
consider the district court's "strict scrutiny" analysis. Rather, it held that
"COPA's reliance on 'contemporary community standards' in the context of the
electronic medium of the Web to identify material that is harmful to minors"
rendered the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. 3' The Government petitioned
for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted plenary review. In Ashcroft v.

26

See Pub. L. 105-277, Div. C, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (2003) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §

231(1998)).
27 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 570 (2002).
28 See Reno v. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, affd on other grounds, 217 F.3d 162 (2000),
vacated, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
29 See id. at 493.
30 See id. at 498.
31 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (2000).
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American Civil Liberties Union ("Ashcroft"),32 by a vote of eight to one, the
Supreme Court held that the Third Circuit erred in its holding on the
"community standards" provision.33 The Court vacated the judgment so that
the Third Circuit could address the other "difficult issues" raised by the
plaintiffs.34
The case produced five opinions, none of which commanded a majority,
and the Justices staked out four distinct positions. Justice Thomas wrote a
plurality opinion joined in full only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Antonin Scalia. He acknowledged that juries in different sections of the
country would apply different standards in prosecutions under COPA; he also
acknowledged that "Web publishers currently lack the ability to limit access to
their sites on a geographic basis. 3 5 But he rejected the argument that forcing
Web publishers "to cope with the community standards of every hamlet into
which their goods [might] wander" would result in "debilitating self-censorship
that abridges the First Amendment rights of the people. 3 6 Said Justice
Thomas: "If a publisher chooses to send its material into a particular
community ...it is the publisher's responsibility to abide by that community's
standards. ' '37 And if that burden is too great, the publisher "need only take the
simple step of utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its
material into [the communities by whose standards it wishes to be judged]. 38
Justice O'Connor and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in separate opinions,
agreed with Justice Thomas that the plaintiffs had failed to establish substantial
overbreadth on their facial challenge. But they disagreed with Justice
Thomas's analysis of the "community standards" issue. Both asserted that the
Court should "adopt[] a national standard for defining obscenity on the
Internet.' '39 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, in a lengthy opinion joined by
Justice David H. Souter and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, asserted that the
variation in community standards might well render COPA substantially

32

535 U.S. 564 (2002). There were two "Ashcroft" decisions in the 2001 Term; references

to "Ashcrof" in this essay are to the COPA case, not Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234 (2002), involving the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.
33 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 602.
34 See id. at 585.
35 Id. at 577 (plurality opinion).
36 Id. at 580 (plurality opinion).
37 Id. at 583 (plurality opinion).
38 Id. (plurality opinion).

Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Breyer would have reached the same result
as a matter of statutory construction. See id. at 590 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
39
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overbroad, but that this determination could not be made "without first
assessing the extent of the speech covered
and the variations in community
40
standards with respect to that speech.,
Justice Stevens dissented alone. He disputed Justice Thomas's analysis of
"community standards" as well as Justice Kennedy's application of the
overbreadth doctrine. In his view, "even the narrowest version of the statute
abridges a substantial amount of protected speech that many communities
would not find harmful to minors.",4 ' Given that "Web speakers cannot limit
access to those specific communities," he would have held the statute
"substantially overbroad regardless of how its other provisions are construed. '42
Looking at the Ashcroft opinions alone, one might conclude that, of the
members of the current Court, Justice Stevens is the most sympathetic to the
values of free speech, while Justice Thomas, along with the Chief Justice and
Justice Scalia, is least sympathetic. Indeed, I suspect that many Court watchers
would find this alignment to be precisely what they would expect. They would
assume that Justice Stevens is a "liberal" and that Justice Thomas is a
"conservative," and they would see the Ashcroft case as a perfect exemplar of
the Justices' respective attitudes toward First Amendment claims generally.
Neither of these conclusions is correct. The Justices' votes and opinions in
First Amendment cases reveal patterns that are both more complex and more
interesting.

II. How THE JUSTICES VOTED IN FREE SPEECH CASES
During the eight Terms that began in 1994, the Supreme Court handed
down a total of forty-seven decisions involving freedom of speech (including
freedom of association).43 This was also a period in which the membership of
the Court remained unchanged. The combination of these two circumstances
offers an unparalleled opportunity to seek insights into First Amendment
principles by examining the records of individual Justices. In this Article, I
shall concentrate on two Justices: Justice Thomas, the author of the plurality
opinion in Ashcroft, and Justice Stevens, the only dissenter.

40

41
42

Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 610 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id.

This figure does not include cases in which free speech issues were raised but not
decided. See, e.g., City News & Novelty, Inc, v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278 (2001).
43
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Happily, Professor Eugene Volokh has compiled the relevant information
about how the Justices voted in free speech cases. In an article 'published in
2001 and brought up to date in 2002, Professor Volokh used the data set of
forty-seven cases "to rigorously identify the free speech maximalists and
minimalists."44 He explained his method as follows:
1. For each of the [47], [he] counted 1point each time a Justice voted for the
free speech claimant, and 0 points each time the Justice voted against.
2. [He] then adjusted up by 1/3 whenever the Justice wrote or joined an
opinion that was more speech-protective than the majority (or plurality) or
than the lead dissent, and down by 1/3 whenever the Justice wrote or joined a
similarly more speech-restrictive opinion.
3. For the cases that involved two or three separate issues, [he] split the
points accordingly.

Table 1
How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2002
(N = 47)
1

Kennedy

74.47%

2 (tie)

Souter

60.99%

Thomas

60.99%

--

Court.

58.16%

4

Stevens

55.67%

5

Ginsburg

53.55%

6

Scalia

49.65%

7

O'Connor

44.68%

8

Rehnquist

41.84%

9

Breyer

39.72%

4. [He] then divided the result by the number of cases, and multiplied by 100
to produce a percentage. 45

Eugene Volokh, How the JusticesVoted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000,48 UCLAL.
REv. 1191 (2001). The update can be found on Professor Volokh's Web site, (visited Dec. 7,
2002) <http://wwwl.law.ucla.edu/- volokh/howvoted.htm>.
45 Id. at 1191-92.
44

2003]

SEX, DRUGS, AND DEMOCRACY

425

Professor Volokh' s results are given in Table 1.46 Contrary to the inference
one might have drawn from the opinions in Ashcroft (or from general
perceptions of "liberal" and "conservative" Justices), Justice Stevens is not the
most speech-protective Justice on the current Court. That honor goes - by a
rather wide margin - to Justice Kennedy. Justice Stevens ranks only as #4; his
score is actually lower than that of Justice Thomas, the author of the plurality
opinion in Ashcroft. In fact, Justice Thomas ties with Justice Souter for
position #2. The Justice who ranks at the bottom in his willingness to support a
free speech claim is Justice Breyer.
These results will no doubt surprise many of those who follow the Court
only casually. And (as Professor Volokh acknowledges) some will question the
value of lumping all free speech cases into a single data set.47 To shed further
light on the Justices' views and their implications for free speech theory, I
supplemented Professor Volokh's tallies in two ways. First, I disaggregated
three categories of cases that are large enough to warrant examining separately:
sexually themed expression, commercial speech, and regulation of elections.
Second, for each category as well as for the whole, I identified the score for
"the Court," which is the score of the Justice who wrote the majority or
plurality opinion. This enables us to compare individual Justices' scores with
those of the Court as an institution. The results are presented in Tables 2
through 5.
Table 2 isolates the cases involving sexually themed expression.
Consistent with his lone dissent in Ashcroft, Justice Stevens leads the Court in
his receptivity to First Amendment claims of this kind. There is not a single
case among the eight in the set in which Justice Stevens took a position that
was less speech-protective than the Court's majority. Only once did he vote to
uphold any of the regulations that came before the Court. In Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 48 plaintiffs
challenged three statutory provisions dealing with the broadcasting of "patently
offensive" sex-related materials on cable television. Justice Stevens joined freespeech minimalist Justice Breyer
in sustaining one of the regulations while
49
striking down the other two.

See id. at 1193. Because I used the Access database program rather than a spreadsheet
program, the tables in this essay use decimals instead of percentages.
See id. at 1195.
46

48

518 U.S. 727 (1996).

49

See id.
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Table 2
How the Justices Voted on Sexually Themed Expression

(N = 8)
1

Stevens

95.83%

2

Ginsburg

91.67%

3

Souter

81.25%

4

Kennedy

70.83%

--

Court

58.33%

5

Breyer

56.25%

6

O'Connor

31.25%

7

Thomas

27.08%

8

Rehnquist

18.75%

9

Scalia

0.00%

In contrast, Justice Thomas, the author of the plurality opinion in Ashcroft,
ranks near the bottom in his willingness to overturn laws that regulate sexually
themed speech. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia - the two
Justices who joined the Ashcroft plurality opinion in full - view sexually
themed expression from a less sympathetic perspective. In Denver Area
Consortium, for example, Justice Thomas - again joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia - voted to uphold all three of the challenged
provisions. 50
So the Ashcroft alignment is quite representative of the Justices' positions
in cases involving sexually themed speech. 5 1 But we know that it is not
representative of the entire universe of free speech cases. Table 3 presents the
Justices' scores for all First Amendment cases except those involving sexually
themed speech. The array is similar to that of Table 1, but with some important
differences. In particular, Justice Thomas stands alone as #2, with Justice
Souter dropping to #4. Justice Stevens ties with Justice O'Connor for #5; both
have scores lower than that of the Court as a whole.

50 See id.
51 In Ashcroft, Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Kennedy in recognizing

"a very real likelihood that [COPA] is overbroad and cannot survive [a facial] challenge."
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Those three Justices rank,
#3, #2, and #4, respectively, in Table 2.
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Table 3
How the Justices Voted on Everything Except Sexually Themed Expression
(N = 39)
1

Kennedy

75.21%

2

Thomas

67.95%

3

Scalia

59.83%

--

Court

58.12%

4

Souter

56.84%

5 (tie)

Stevens

47.44%

O'Connor

47.44%

Rehnquist

46.58%

8

Ginsburg

45.73%

9

BreVer

36.32%

7

What kinds of free speech claims receive a more sympathetic reception
from Justice Thomas than from Justice Stevens? Part of the answer is found in
Table 4, which shows how the Justices voted in cases involving governmental
regulation of elections. Justice Thomas stands at the head of the column; no
other member of the Court votes more consistently to support First Amendment
challenges to laws that limit the rights of candidates or political parties. Justice
Stevens - the zealous protector of sexually themed expression - ties with
Justice Ginsburg for last place.
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Table 4
How the Justices Voted on Regulation of Elections
(N =9)
1

Thomas

92.59%

2

Kennedy

85.19%

3

Scalia

77.78%

4

Rehnquist

51.85%

--

Court

50.00%

5

Souter

50.00%

6

O'Connor

46.30%

7

Breyer

31.48%

9 (tie)

Stevens

29.63%

Ginsburg

29.63%

-

Table 5
How the Justices Voted on Commercial Speech

(N =8)
1

Thomas

2

Souter

89.58%

3

Kennedy,

83.33%

4

Scalia

79.17%

--

Court

70.83%

5

Stevens

70.83%

6

Rehnquist

62.50%

7 (tie)

Ginsburg

54.17%

O'Connor

54.17%

Brever

37.50%

9

102.08%

[Vol. 41
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The final disaggregated category is commercial speech (Table 5). Once
52
again Justice Thomas emerges as the leading "free speech maximalist.
Indeed, because of the way Professor Volokh calculates the scores, Justice
Thomas's score actually exceeds 100 percent. Justice Stevens stands exactly in
the middle - and with the same score as the Court as an institution.
The contrasting views of Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens on
commercial speech played out in a decision handed down just a few weeks
before Ashcroft. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,53 the Court
struck down provisions of a federal statute that prohibited pharmacies from
advertising "compounded drugs., 54 The Court applied the familiar four-part
test first announced in 1980 in CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corporationv.
Public Service Commission of New York.55 Justice Thomas joined the Court
opinion in full, but added a brief concurring opinion to reiterate his view that
the relatively permissive Central Hudson test should not be applied "to a
restriction of 'commercial' speech, at least when, as here, the asserted interest is
one that is to be achieved through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in
the dark.' ' 56 Justice Stevens joined the dissenters who would have upheld the
challenged provisions.
I. SEX, DEMOCRACY,

AND JUSTICE STEVENS

Justice Stevens's dissent in Ashcroft is written rather matter-of-factly, with
few rhetorical flourishes and little evidence of passion. To appreciate the
strength of his commitment to the protection of sexually themed expression, we
can turn to his dissent in City of Erie v. Pap'sA.M., a decision from the 1999
Term. The case arose when the city of Erie adopted an ordinance making it a
summary offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a "state of
nudity., 58 The ordinance was challenged by the operator of Kandyland, an
establishment that featured totally nude erotic dancing performed by women. A
majority of the Court held that the Erie ordinance was constitutional, but Justice

52

53
54
of this
55
56
57
58

See Volokh, supra note 44, at 1191.
535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Readers who have been eagerly awaiting the discussion of "drugs" promised in the title
Article can now relax. This is it.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377.
529 U.S. 277 (2000).
Id. at 284.
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Stevens, joined
only by Justice Ginsburg, insisted that it violated the First
59
Amendment.
Justice Stevens began with the proposition that "nude dancing fits well
within a broad, cultural tradition recognized as expressive in nature and entitled
to First Amendment protection." 6 He found it "perfectly clear [that] the city of
Erie [had] totally silenced a message the dancers at Kandyland want[ed] to
convey." 6 Because the Court had "not even tried to defend the ordinance's
total ban on the ground that its censorship of protected speech might be
justified by an overriding state interest," he argued
that the Court "should
2
conclude that the ordinance is patently invalid."
Justice Stevens's position in Pap'sA.M. can be usefully contrasted with his
position in Republican Partyof Minnesota v. White,63 a case decided two years
later (almost contemporaneously with Ashcroft). In Minnesota, as in many
other states, judges are selected by popular election. The Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted a rule that prohibited candidates for judicial office from
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. 64 The United
States Supreme Court held that the provision violated the First Amendment.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that the "announce clause"
prohibited speech on the basis of its content; it imposed a burden on speech that
is "at the core of our First Amendment freedoms;"
and it was not narrowly
65
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion; he also joined the dissent of
Justice Ginsburg. In the dissenters' view, the state's regulation "should
encounter no First Amendment shoal. 66 The court rule was a "precisely
targeted speech
restriction" designed to further the state interest in judicial
67
integrity.

59 Justice Souter concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the plurality
that
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate, but argued that the record before the Court did "not
permit the conclusion that Erie's ordinance [was] reasonably designed to mitigate real harms."
Id. at 317 (opinion of Souter, J.).
60 Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 331-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
64 See id. at 2531.
65 Id. at 2534 (quoting the court of appeals).
66 Id. at 2552 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 2550 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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To give concreteness to their debate, the majority and the dissent
considered the possibility that a candidate would want to tell the voters
(perhaps in response to a question): "I think it is constitutional for the
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages." 68 The dissenters made clear that, in
their view, if a state supreme court chooses to prohibit candidates for election to
that court from making such statements, the First Amendment does not stand in
the way.69
Justice Stevens thus sees a ban on nude dancing as a grave threat to free
speech because it "totally silence[s] a message that the dancers . . . want to
convey. ' 70 But he sees no such threat in a state supreme court's regulation that
prohibits judicial candidates from telling voters about their position on disputed
legal issues. One need not be committed to originalism to find this pairing of
positions to be anomalous at the very least.7' What theory of the First
Amendment supports it?
As it happens, Justice Stevens has published a lecture setting forth in some
detail his general approach to deciding First Amendment cases.72 Although the
lecture antedates the period of this study, I think it is reasonable to take it as a
guide to Justice Stevens's jurisprudence today.
Three things stand out in the lecture. The first is the opening paragraph.
Justice Stevens begins by talking about "the injustice and conflict" produced by
"the seeds of intolerance." 73 He asks "why (or perhaps even whether) the First
Amendment to our Constitution should afford extraordinary protection to the
apostles of intolerance., 74 But what are Justice Stevens's examples of the
"injustice and conflict" that intolerance produces? One is the execution, by
burning, of Joan of Arc in Rouen, France, in the year 143 1.75 Another is the
hanging of nineteen persons accused of witchcraft in Salem, Massachusetts, in
1692.76

See id. at 2537 (Court opinion); see also id. at 2558 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2558 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70 See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 322 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
71 Although this Article focuses on Justice Stevens, I note that Justice Ginsburg agreed with
68
69

Justice Stevens in both Pap'sA.M. and Republican Party of Minnesota.
72 See John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE
L.J. 1293 (1993).
73 Id.
74 Id. It is curious - and unfortunate - that Justice Stevens refers to those who
foment
intolerance as "apostles." Especially when one considers the examples he uses, Justice Stevens
leaves the impression that he associates intolerance with religious belief.
75 Coyly, Justice Stevens describes Joan of Arc but does not mention her by
name.
76 Justice Stevens also says, "Today the weeds of intolerance poison the relations between
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Joan of Arc led the French army against the English during the Hundred
Years' War. After participating in battles for more than a year, she was
captured by the opposing troops. Because the English commanders wanted to
undermine the French people's faith in her and the French king whom she
championed, they handed her over to the church authorities to be tried for
heresy and other religious crimes. She was found guilty, turned over to the
English, and burned at the stake."
Shakespeare would not have agreed with Justice Stevens's admiring
characterization of Joan.M 78 The Catholic Church, on the other hand, has
declared her to be a saint.79 But what any of this history has to do with
protecting speech by "apostles of intolerance" in this country today is difficult
to fathom.
The Salem Witch Trials are closer to the First Amendment in time and
geography, but not much else. Women (and a few men) were condemned and
burned because the civil authorities believed that they had practiced witchcraft
and that their conduct caused physical and spiritual injury to others. 80 Justice
Stevens may not share that belief, but a prominent historian, Chadwick Hansen,
has concluded "that witchcraft was practiced in Salem, that it did harm to
persons claimed to be victims, and that it posed a real threat to the
community. ' ' 8 1 Once again, Justice Stevens has chosen a historical episode that
sheds little if any light on the problems of interpreting the First Amendment.
From a doctrinal perspective, the most interesting aspect of the lecture is
Justice Stevens's rejection of what he refers to as "black-letter rules" and
"abstract categories." 82 Justice Stevens particularly challenges "the purported
rule" against regulation based on content.83 He argues that rather than
following a categorical approach, the Court should decide cases with
"sensitivity to context" and should "evaluate the legitimacy and adequacy of a
state's interests in abridging speech." 84 Otherwise, says Justice Stevens,
neighbors in all parts of the globe." Stevens, supra note 72, at 1293. He cites Bosnia and
Azerbaijan as well as "some parts of the United States." Id. at 1293.
77

The summary in this paragraph is based on the account in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA

BRITANNICA

225 (1976).
78 See JOHN JULIUS NORWICH, SHAKESPEARE'S KINGS 223-26 (2000).
79 See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 225, 228
(1976).
80 See 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 899 (1976).
81 Id.; see also generally CHADWICK HANSEN, WITCHCRAFr AT SALEM (1969).
82 See Stevens, supra note 72, at 1301-02.
83 See id. at 1304; see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER & ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, THE
AMENDMENT: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS

84

Stevens, supra note 72, at 1301.
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"deserving speech may be left unprotected while unimportant speech is
overprotected. ' ' 5
The flaw in Justice Stevens's approach is that when judges focus on "state
interests" with "sensitivity to context" rather than applying rules, there is a real
danger that the judges will evaluate the "state interests" and the "context" from
a perspective that is essentially legislative. If the judge views the "state
interests" as trivial or misguided, he will readily find the speech to be
"deserving." Conversely, when the judge looks favorably upon the "state
interests," he is likely to conclude that the targeted speech is "undeserving" or
"unimportant." This, indeed, may help to explain why Justice Stevens could
vote to overturn the city of Erie's ban on nude dancing while voting to leave in
place the Minnesota Supreme Court's limits on speech by judicial candidates.
A third aspect of Justice Stevens's lecture may also be relevant. There is
almost nothing in the lecture that recognizes the connection between the First
Amendment and democratic theory. This is a curious omission. As Professor
James Weinstein has explained:
[t]he connection between free speech and democracy is manifest. As the
ultimate source of political authority, the people must be able to talk to one
another about the performance of governmental officials and the policies
these officials implement. If government could punish speech with which it
disagrees, then the public opinion that influences official decisionmaking and
ultimately determines whether governmental officials will stay in power
would reflect
not the will of the people but the will of the governmental
86
officials.

Thus, if those who temporarily hold governmental power cut off the speech that
might influence citizens to oust them from office and replace them with new
representatives, they have subverted the democratic process almost as
thoroughly as if they had cancelled the next election. 87

85

Id.

86

JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATT'ACK ON FREE

SPEECH DOCTRINE 12 (1999).

87 Much the same point was made by Karl Popper, one of the Twentieth Century's greatest
philosophers - and one who saw at first hand the subversion of democracy through brute force
as well as manipulation of the legal system. Popper's view was summarized recently by a
contemporary philosopher: "The essence of democracy is ...the possibility of (peacefully)
removing a government that does not stand up to critical appraisal..." Colin McGinn, Looking
for a Black Swan, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 21, 2002, at 46 (emphasis in original).
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To be sure, Justice Stevens does say that "[w]hen official power is used to
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics and matters of opinion, and to force
citizens to adhere to those views, then the central purpose of the Amendment is
threatened. ' , 88 But that is at best a weak and incomplete articulation of the
importance of free speech to democratic self-governance. It makes no mention
of the special concern for assuring that the people "have access to all available
information" 89 and to competing views so that they can, if they wish, choose
different representatives who will implement different policies. Nor does it
recognize what has been referred to in other contexts as structural suspicion suspicion that those who hold political office will enact or enforce laws in a
way that helps them to maintain their grip on power. 9°
If Justice Stevens had placed democratic self-govemance, rather than
tolerance, at the center of his vision of "the freedom of speech," 9' it is unlikely
that he would have taken such a benign view of the regulation in Minnesota
Republican Party v. White. 92 Here was a state supreme court using its
disciplinary authority to limit the speech of candidates for judicial offices including candidates for election to that same court. That does not necessarily
mean that the regulation should have been held unconstitutional. But recall that
it was Justice Stevens who protested so vigorously when the Court allowed the
city of Erie to "silence" the message that the dancers at Kandyland wanted to
convey to the establishment's patrons.93 Surely the Justice who wrote that
opinion should have been at least as alarmed when the Minnesota Supreme
Court sought to silence the messages that judicial candidates might want to
convey to the state's voters.
IV. SEX, DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE THOMAS

Justice Thomas's plurality opinion in Ashcroft evinces little concern for the
expressive interests of the individuals and enterprises who might want to
publish material of a sexual nature on their websites. He takes the position that
the Court's "community standards jurisprudence," developed in the pre-Internet

Stevens, supra note 72, at 1309.
Frederick N. Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74
REv.761, 778 (1986).
90 For further discussion, see infra Part V.
91 See generally Stevens, supra note 72.
88
89

536 U.S. 765 (2002).
93 See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 322 (2000).
92

CAL.

L.

2003]

SEX, DRUGS, AND DEMOCRACY

435

era, applies fully to the World Wide Web. 94 He adheres to this view even
though he recognizes that "Web publishers currently lack the ability to limit
access to their sites on a geographic basis;" 95 thus, anyone who posts material
with a sexual theme on his website runs the risk that his material will be judged
by the "community standards" of the "most puritan" community." But what is
Justice Thomas's response? "If a publisher wishes for its material to be judged
only by the standards of particular communities, then it need only take the
simple step of utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its
material into those communities.'
In other words, the publisher should refrain
from placing its material on the World Wide Web.
This "let them eat cake" attitude seems quite inconsistent with the broad
support for free speech claims manifested by Justice Thomas's votes and
opinions outside the realm of sexually themed expression. As with Justice
Stevens, we must ask: what theory of free speech would explain this
combination of positions?
Justice Thomas has not published a lecture outlining his view of freedom of
speech, but in 2001, in his concurring opinion in LorillardTobacco Company
v. Reilly,98 he offered an eloquent defense of a broad construction of the First
Amendment:
No legislature has ever sought to restrict speech about an activity it regarded
as harmless and inoffensive. Calls for limits on expression always are made
when the specter of some threatened harm is looming. The identity of the
harm may vary. People will be inspired by totalitarian dogmas and subvert
the Republic. They will be inflamed by racial demagoguery and embrace
hatred and bigotry. Or they will be enticed by cigarette advertisements and
choose to smoke, risking disease. It is therefore no answer for the State to say
that the makers of cigarettes are doing harm: perhaps they are. But in that
respect they are no different from the purveyors of other harmful products, or
the advocates of harmful ideas. When the State seeks to silence them, they
99
are all entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.
Conspicuously missing from this paean to free speech is any reference to
sexually oriented expression. Justice Thomas might have included among his

94 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002).
Id. at 577.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 583.
95

98

533 U.S. 525 (2001).

99 Id. at 590 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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examples: "People will be aroused by sexually explicit materials and commit
crimes or lose their moral compass." But he did not say that, or anything like it.
One possible explanation is that in at least some of the sex-related speech
cases that have come before the Court during the last eight terms, the
government did not defend restrictions on speech by pointing to the harm
allegedly caused by the responses of the individuals who read or view the
prohibited material. For example, in Pap's A.M., the city did not argue that
Kandyland' s patrons would be corrupted by viewing performers dancing in the
nude; rather,
it relied on the "harmful secondary effects associated with nude
°
dancing."'
That is not a complete explanation, however, because Justice Thomas has
made clear that he has no quarrel with the existing law of obscenity. For
example, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 1 Justice
Thomas joined the Court in striking down a federal statute regulating cable
television operators who provide channels "primarily dedicated to sexuallyoriented programming."'' 2 But he wrote separately to emphasize that if any of
the programming was "obscene as this Court defined the term," the government
could "sanction [those] broadcasts with criminal penalties."'' 3
The prohibition of "obscenity" is justified by the "specter of [the] harm""
that allegedly results from the responses of people who read or view the
outlawed material. Further, under the current regime, the government may
silence "purveyors" of material that is legally "obscene" even when distribution
of the material is limited to willing adults. ° 5 And we can be confident that if
Justice Thomas
disagreed with the law as it now stands, he would not hesitate
6
So.10
say
to
Opinions like the one in Playboy Entertainment,as well as the pattern of
votes reflected in Table 2, thus leave little doubt that the omission of any
reference to "sexually explicit materials" in the Lorillardconcurrence was not
inadvertent. In Justice Thomas's view, the First Amendment protects makers of

100 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000).
101 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
102

Id. at 806.

Id. at 829 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001).
105 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973).
106 See, e.g., Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
103

104
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cigarettes, advocates of "totalitarian dogmas,"'' 0 7 and (in Justice Stevens's
phrase) apostles of intolerance. 108 But it does not necessarily protect those who
purvey materials with a sexual theme.
If this concept of free speech sounds familiar, there is good reason. It
corresponds very closely to the vision articulated by Justice Brennan in
landmark opinions during his first decade on the Supreme Court. In Roth v.
United States,109 Justice Brennan wrote for the Court:
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people ....All ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful
to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of
more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is
0
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."
And in New York Times Company v. Sullivan,' Justice Brennan located the
"central meaning of the First Amendment" in the controversy over the Sedition
Act of 1798 and the "broad consensus" that the statute violated the First
Amendment "because' 12of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government
and public officials." "
Justice Brennan's opinions in Roth and Sullivan embrace an approach to
the First Amendment that captures the essence of the connection between free
speech and democracy discussed earlier. Expression is protected "to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."'" 3 Criticism of government receives the
highest level of protection because by its very nature it is the speech most likely
to threaten the grip on power of those who temporarily hold governmental
office. Obscenity receives no protection, but it is speech that is most unlikely to
influence citizens in their choice of representatives.

Lorillard,533 U.S. at 590.
108 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
109 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
110 Id. at 484.
107

I 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 273,276.

112

"13

Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
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Justice Thomas's position today departs from Justice Brennan's stance in
the 1960s in two important respects." 4 His exclusion of "obscenity" from the
protection of the First Amendment sometimes leads him to be unsympathetic to
free speech claims by purveyors of material that is sexual in nature but not
legally obscene. At the same time, he has become the Court's most zealous
protector of commercial speech, relying on the proposition that the First
Amendment stands as an absolute barrier to "all attempts to dissuade legal
choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant." ' 5
As this last quotation indicates, Justice Thomas's rationale for protecting
commercial speech closely tracks - if indeed it is not derived from - theories
that give primacy to the importance of free expression in preserving democratic
self-government. And in a striking colloquy with Justice Stevens, Justice
Thomas has explicitly recognized the connection between the First Amendment
and popular sovereignty. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. FederalElection Commission ("Colorado Republican I"), the
Court held unconstitutional a section of the Federal Election Campaign Act that
limited "independent" expenditures by political parties in support of political
candidates.116 Justice Stevens, joined only by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, voted
to uphold the statute. He argued that the Court should "accord special
deference to [the judgment of Congress] on questions related to the extent and
nature of limits on campaign spending." '" 7 Justice Thomas, who concurred in
the Court's judgment (although he thought it did not go far enough), responded:
This position poses great risk to the First Amendment, in that it amounts to
letting the fox stand watch over the henhouse. There is good reason to think
that campaign reform is an especially inappropriate area for judicial deference
to legislative judgment. What the argument for deference fails to
acknowledge is the potential for legislators to set the rules of the electoral

114

In 1973, Justice Brennan repudiated his prior views on obscenity and adopted the

position that "at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to
unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal
Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of
their allegedly 'obscene' contents." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Curiously, while Justice Brennan became more protective of sexually
oriented expression in his later years, he retreated from his commitment to the "unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269; see Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), discussed infra Part V.
"5
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,526 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
116 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
"17 Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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game so as to keep themselves in power and to keep potential challengers out
of it." 8
While Justice Thomas has not explicitly extended this reasoning to limitations
on speech that operate only indirectly to help legislators "keep themselves in
power," his overall record of votes and opinions in free speech cases comports
with the approach that it embraces.
To be sure, Justice Thomas ranks low on Professor Volokh's scale in cases
involving expression of a sexual nature. But regulations that target such
expression seldom pose a threat to democratic self-governance. Nor is there
reason to think that the laws are in any way motivated by legislators' desire to
maintain their grip on power. There may be other aspects of First Amendment
theory that would condemn laws like Erie's anti-nudity ordinance, but the
"unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
20
9
changes desired by the people"" is not placed at risk. 1
V. SEX, DEMOCRACY, AND FREE SPEECH
I do not defend Justice Thomas's plurality opinion in Ashcroft.12' Given
the wide diversity of community standards in this country, it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that, under the plurality's approach, the Child Online Protection

118 Id. at 644 n.9 (concurring opinion) (citation omitted).
119 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
120

While this article was in the final stages of preparation, the Supreme Court handed down

its decision in Virginia v. Black, No. 01-1107, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 7,2003). The Court held that
"a state, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent
to intimidate." Id. at 1. However, a majority of the Court also concluded that "the provision in
the Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate
renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form." Id. at 5. Justice Thomas would have
upheld the statute in its entirety. He argued that the law "prohibits only conduct, not
expression" and thus that "there is no need to analyze it under any of our First Amendment
tests." Id. at 57 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Nor did he see any constitutional infirmity in the prima
facie evidence provision.
Justice Thomas's opinion is a great disappointment. Technically, perhaps, his position is
consistent with his statement in Lorillardthat the First Amendment protects those who engage
in "racial demagoguery" that may cause people to "embrace hatred and bigotry." Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001). The Lorillard opinion refers to "speech,"
while the point of the dissent in Black is that the Virginia statute prohibits only "conduct." But
drawing the line between "demagoguery" and "intimidation" requires more sensitive tools than
the superficial application of a distinction between "speech" and "conduct."
121
535 U.S. 564 (2002).
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Act would chill a great deal of expression whose distribution to adults is fully
protected. And as Justice Kennedy pointed out in his concurring opinion, "it is
no answer to say that the speaker should 'take the simple step of utilizing a
[different] medium.'" 122 One of the oldest lines of First Amendment precedent
establishes that a legislature must meet a heavy burden of justification
when it
123
enacts a law that "foreclose[s] an entire medium of expression."'
The Court recognized this principle more than sixty years ago in Schneider
v. New Jersey124 when it struck down city ordinances that prohibited the
distribution of handbills on city streets. The cities argued that the ordinances
were valid "because their operation is limited to streets and alleys and leaves
persons free to distribute printed matter in other public places.' 25 The Court
responded: "the streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of
information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place."' 126 Substitute "the World Wide Web" for "the streets," and
the point applies with equal force.
Justice Thomas accepts this body of law; 127 why then is he so indifferent to
the prospect that some would-be publishers will forego the communicative
possibilities of the World Wide Web because they fear that their material will
be judged by the standards of the "most puritan"'128 community? One answer is
that he does not really concede the premise; he argues in a footnote that COPA
does not in fact "banish[] from the Web material deemed harmful to minors by
reference to community standards;" it merely "requires that such material be
placed behind adult identification screens."' 29 I suspect, however, that there
may be a deeper reason: that COPA, unlike the laws in Schneider and similar
cases, regulates only a limited class of speech - sexually oriented speech - and
that Justice Thomas views that class of speech as less worthy of protection than
political, commercial, or other kinds of expression.
Ironically, the strongest support for this approach in any Supreme Court
decisions can be found in a pair of plurality opinions written by none other than

125

Id. at 596 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
Id. at 163.

126

Id.

127

He concurred in Justice Stevens's opinion in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43
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(1994).
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Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 577 (2002).
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Id. at 583 n.14.
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Justice Stevens. In Young v. American Mini Theatres,1 30 the Court allowed the
city of Detroit to limit the geographic location of motion picture theaters that
131
exhibited sexually explicit "adult movies." In FCC v. PacificaFoundation,
the Court upheld the power of the FCC to regulate a radio broadcast that was
indecent but not obscene. Justice Stevens, in rejecting the theater owner's and
broadcaster's constitutional claims, relied on two propositions that would go far
to justify the position Justice Thomas takes in Ashcroft.
First, Justice Stevens insisted (and he continues to believe) that "neither all
speech, nor even all protected speech, has the same value."' 132 Thus, in
Pacifica, Justice Stevens acknowledged that the FCC order "may lead some
broadcasters to censor themselves."' 33 But this was not a reason for holding the
order unconstitutional, Justice Stevens said, because the self-censorship would
affect expression that "surely lie[s] at the periphery of First Amendment
concern."' 134 And in what Justice Stevens later referred to as a "much maligned
paragraph,"' 135 he wrote:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the
total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it
is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment .... [F]ew of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right
to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. 36

If society has a lesser interest in protecting depictions of "specified sexual
activities" than it does in protecting "untrammeled political debate," perhaps it
also has a lesser interest in protecting the materials that a publisher would
refrain from placing on its website because of COPA.
Second, in upholding the constitutionality of the FCC order at issue in
Pacifica, Justice Stevens said: "A requirement that indecent language be
avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of

130
131
132
133
134

427 U.S. 50 (1976).

438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Stevens, supra note 72, at 1306.
Pacifica,438 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion).
Id.

Stevens, supra note 72, at 1306.
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion). The reference
of course is to the statement attributed to Voltaire: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it." Id. at 63.
135
136
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serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be
expressed by the use of less offensive language."' 137 Perhaps one might
similarly argue that Web publishers who fear that their materials may be
regarded as "harmful to minors"' 138 in the "most puritan' ' 139 communities need

only use "less offensive language"' 140 for the expression of their thoughts.
Justice Thomas may agree with the first proposition, but he does not accept
the second. On the contrary, he has endorsed Justice Harlan's view that the
41
First Amendment accords full protection "to expressions of intensity."'
Requiring speakers to use "less offensive language" is inconsistent with the
recognition that the "emotive function" of speech "may often be the 14more
2
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated."'
Whatever the rationale, the position of the plurality opinion in Ashcroft
remains troubling. Nevertheless, as between the overall First Amendment
approach of Justice Thomas and the overall approach of Justice Stevens, I
would unhesitatingly choose the former. If Justice Thomas's opinions were
controlling, the government would be allowed to "banish" or "silence" some
sex-related expression that a free society ought to allow. But if Justice
Stevens's views prevailed, the government would be free to silence core
political speech and curtail the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people." 143 What is even
worse, Justice Stevens seems almost willfully blind to the connection between
free speech and democratic self-governance.
In his classic book Democracy and Distrust, Professor John Hart Ely
explained the connection in characteristically pungent prose. "Courts must
police inhibitions on expression and other political activity because we cannot
trust elected officials to do so: ins have a way of wanting to make sure the outs
stay out."' 144 More pointedly, Ely noted that government officials "whose
continu[ing] authority depends on the silencing of other voices" will readily
conclude, "in all goodfaith," that they have found compelling reasons for the
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138
139

140
141

(citing
142

143
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Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n.18.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 570 (2002).
Id. at 577.
Pacifica,438 U.S. at 743 n. 18.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,415 n.3 (2000) (Thomas J., dissenting)
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971)).
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 106 (1980).
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restrictions. 145 Thus, when the "ins" seek to silence other voices in
circumstances where doing so will help "to make sure the outs stay out," courts
should deploy not only strict scrutiny but also deep skepticism.
That, too often, is exactly what one does not find in Justice Stevens's
opinions. For example, in Austin v. Michigan Chamberof Commerce146 - a
decision handed down before the period of Professor Volokh's study - the
Court upheld a Michigan law that prohibited corporations from making
contributions and independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates for
election to state offices. Justice Stevens concurred, blandly asserting that "the
danger of either the fact, or the appearance, of quid pro quo relationships
provides an adequate justification for state regulation of both expenditures and
contributions."'' 47 A Justice who recognized that "ins have a way of wanting to
make sure the outs stay out" would have been far more skeptical of the
"appearance of corruption" justification put forward by the state. 148 Here was a
law that restricted the speech of ordinary corporations - but not the speech of
unincorporated labor unions or media corporations or wealthy individuals.
That aspect of the scheme should alone have suggested that, as Justice Scalia
said in dissent, "the object of the law... [was] not to prevent wrongdoing but
to prevent speech.' ' 149 Justice Thomas was not yet a member of the Court when
Austin was decided, but his opinions in50 later cases leave no doubt that he would
have found the law unconstitutional.
The law challenged in Austin operated directly to help those who held
power in the state "to make sure that the outs stay[ed] out."''
Other
regulations of speech may operate indirectly to the same effect. Here too,
Justice Stevens's "sensitivity [to] context"'152 and his concern for "the interests
at stake"' 153 can blind him to the need for structural suspicion. For example, in
Hill v. Colorado,154 Justice Stevens wrote the Court's opinion upholding a state
law that limited speech-related activity within 100 feet of the entrance to any
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494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id. at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring).
148 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
149 Id. at 694 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,
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465-66 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing prior concurring and dissenting opinions).
151 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
152 See Stevens, supra note 72, at 1305.
153 See id. at 1302.
154 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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health care facility.55 As the Court acknowledged, enactment of the law "was
primarily motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics."' 56 The
"activities" consisted of protests and attempts to dissuade women from getting
57
abortions. 1
From these facts, we may fairly infer that a majority of the Colorado
legislature was strongly committed to protecting abortion rights. The
protesters, of course, stood on the opposite side of this deeply felt public issue.
The more effectively the anti-abortion faction could carry its message to the
state's citizens, the more likely it was that the voters would send a new set of
legislators to the state capitol. In this light - and irrespective of the legislators'
good faith - there was every reason for courts to examine the law with an
attitude of deep distrust. At a minimum, this was an occasion to heed Professor
Ely's warning that courts should not "allow the review [even] of measures that
are geared to something other than the perceived dangerousness of the message
to degenerate into what is essentially a 'reasonableness' test."'' 58 But that is
exactly what Justice Stevens did, applying a watered-down version of the
Court's "time, place, and manner"'' 59 standard. Justice Thomas joined Justice
Scalia's powerful dissent.
VI. WHO'S AFRAID OF FREE SPEECH?

Sometime in 2003, the Child Online Protection Act will return to the
Supreme Court. 60 The Court may well hold that the statute satisfies First
Amendment standards. If so, Justice Thomas will probably vote with the
majority and Justice Stevens will undoubtedly dissent. The preliminary
injunction will be lifted, and in all probability, some speech of a sexual nature
will be "banished" from the Web or perhaps "silenced" altogether. But it is
highly unlikely that COPA will chill any speech that would contribute even
indirectly to the ouster of the legislators who voted for it.

155 See id. at 707.
156
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Id. at 715.
See id.
ELY,

supra note 144, at 115.

159 Hill, 530 U.S. at 725.
160 On March 6, 2003, the Third Circuit once again affirmed the district court's grant of a

preliminary injunction. The court held that COPA could not survive strict scrutiny because
several provisions were "not narrowly tailored to achieve the Government's compelling interest
in protecting minors from harmful material." ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir.
2003).
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Also in 2003 (or perhaps in 2004), the campaign finance legislation that
Congress approved in 2002 will come before the Court. 16 1 This law bans "soft
money" - contributions to national political party committees.' 62 It also
prohibits a variety of organizations from financing "electioneering
communications" - advertisements or other communications 63
supporting or
opposing a candidate - within sixty days of a general election.'
In the summer of 2001, while the campaign finance bill was under
consideration, one of its supporters, Representative Harold Ford of Tennessee,
explained why he favored the ban on "electioneering communications."
"Why," he asked, "should any organization regardless [of whether] they are
Democrat or Republican, conservative or liberal, be allowed to come in and
influence the outcome of elections solely to advance some narrow issue of
theirs?"1 64 Of course the way an organization "influences the outcome of [an
election]" is to persuade voters that the organization's position on "some
narrow issue" is not only correct, but so important as to justify voting for one
candidate rather than another.
Rarely will one find such a blatant acknowledgment by one of the "ins" that
he is seeking to suppress the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people."165 I have no doubt
that Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy) will see the
campaign finance law for what it is - a frontal assault on core political
expression.166 I am (regretfully) almost as confident that Justice Stevens will
vote to uphold the law. If Justice Stevens's view prevails, the effect will be to
silence a vast quantity of speech that would otherwise contribute to the debate
on public issues at a time when it matters most - when the voters decide
whether the "ins" will become the "outs."

161 The suit challenging the law was argued before a special three-judge district court in
December 2002. At this writing, no decision has been issued.
162 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2002).
163 See id. at § 441b.
164 Randolph J. May, Broken Reforms, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at 46 (available on

NEXIS, News database) (quoting Rep. Ford).
165 See supra text accompanying note 110.
166 For a brief but devastating critique of the anti-"electioneering" provisions of the Act, see
Akhil Reed Amar, Conspiracy of Silence, AMERICAN LAWYER, Oct. 2002, at 69.

